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Abstract
This paper examines the movement of an individuals reservation level over time in
a two-sided search model with two-sided imperfect self-knowledge, where agents are ver-
tically heterogeneous and do not know their own types. Agents who do not know their
own types update their beliefs about their own types through the o¤ers or rejections
they receive from others. The results in this paper show that an agent with imperfect
self-knowledge revises his or her reservation level downward when the agent receives a
rejection that has some information about his or her own type. In contrast, an agent
with imperfect self-knowledge revises his or her reservation level upward when the agent
receives an o¤er from an agent of the opposite sex who is of lower type than the reserva-
tion level. This upward revision of an agents reservation level is due to the environment
of two-sided imperfect self-knowledge.
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1 Introduction
The potential sources of declining reservation wages have received much attention in the
search literature (see Burdett and Vishwanath (1988)). In particular, the sequence of reser-
vation wage, which completely describes the behavior of agents when search is a sequential
process, declines with the duration of search (see Gronau (1971), Salop (1973), Sant (1977),
and Burdett and Vishwanath (1988)). However, in empirical studies, the e¤ect of search
duration on reservation wage is yet to be well-understood. It is generally ambiguous as to
whether or not declining reservation wages are monotonic and it is di¢ cult to measure the ef-
fect of search duration on reservation wage.1 Several empirical studies show that this decline
is monotonic only when certain conditions on the variables hold in the model (Kiefer and
Neumann (1981), Lancaster (1985), Addison, Centeno, and Portugal (2004), and Brown and
Taylor (2009)).
This paper examines the movement of an individuals reservation level over time in a
two-sided search model with two-sided imperfect self-knowledge. We construct a model in
which searchers of two types (high-type and low-type) do not know their own types, but know
otherstypes.2 They then update their beliefs about their own types when they receive o¤ers
or rejections from others. For example, workers in search of an employer are evaluated by
employers on their abilities when they meet. When a worker is young in terms of experience,
his or her self-assessment is based on limited experience. On the other hand, employers may
have considerable experiences in evaluating workers. At this time, when a young worker
observes an o¤er or a rejection from an employer, he or she learns something about his or her
own type.3 The key feature of this study is that others have better information about agents
types than the agents themselves. Similarly, in the search for a marriage partner, a single
agent is evaluated with regard to his or her marital charms by a member of the opposite
sex when they meet. When an agent is young, his or her self-assessment is based on limited
experience, such as academic achievement and family background. However, because marital
charm is composed of various elements, an individual of the opposite sex may have better
assessments of agentscharm than the agents themselves.4 Hence, when an agent observes
an o¤er or a rejection from a member of the opposite sex, he or she infers something about
his or her own type.
Our study is close in spirit to Burdett and Vishwanath (1988), who show that when
workers learn the unknown wage distribution, the reservation wage of an unemployed worker
declines with his or her unemployment spell. In their model, a high o¤er results in the worker
1This is because both variables are determined simultaneously if reservation wages are exible.
2Though we construct the model with two types of agents to simplify the analysis, the qualitative features
of our main results will not change under a model with n types of agents. If we consider a model in which
there are n types of agents, the learning process becomes very complex. This issue is my next research work.
3Of course, when an experienced worker searches for a new job that is very similar to his or her previous
job, he or she may have a more accurate self-view of his or her ability than employers. However, such situations
are not considered in this paper.
4Marital charm is dened by various elements, including quality, attraction, intelligence, height, age, ed-
ucation, income, position at work, social status, and family background, in much of the literature regarding
marriage.
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getting employed, whereas an o¤er much lower than expected leads the worker to perceive
the jobs available to him or her as jobs o¤ering low wages and then the worker revises his
or her reservation wage downward. Unlike their model, ours is a two-sided search model and
agents know the type distribution but do not know their own types. Specically, in two-sided
search with imperfect self-knowledge, receiving an o¤er is likely to lead to an increase in
the reservation level. In fact, this paper shows that an agent with imperfect self-knowledge
revises his or her reservation level upward when he or she receives an o¤er lower than his or
her reservation level.
We consider the basic framework of Burdett and Coles (1997), which is a two-sided search
model with complete information. Though our model focuses on marriage, one could apply
the ideas and techniques of the present paper to other two-sided search frameworks, such as
the labor market, the housing market, and other markets in which heterogeneous buyers and
sellers search for the right trading partner.5 Using the marriage market interpretation, the
model is described as follows. Single agents are vertically heterogeneous, i.e., there exists
a ranking of marital charm (types). Single men or women enter the market in order to
look for a marital partner. When a man and a woman meet, an opponents type can be
recognized. The agents optimal search strategy has the reservation-level property, i.e., he or
she continues searching until he or she meets a member of the opposite sex who is at least
as good as the predetermined threshold, called the reservation level,which depends on the
agents search cost and the type distribution of agents. If a man and a woman meet and
both agents propose, they marry and leave the market. If at least one of the two decides not
to propose, they separate and continue to search for another partner. Given these settings,
the marriage pattern (i.e., who marries whom) in the market is determined. This marriage
pattern becomes a kind of positive assortative matching.6
The results in this paper show that an agent with imperfect self-knowledge revises his or
her reservation level downward when the agent receives a rejection that has some information
about his or her own type. In contrast, an agent with imperfect self-knowledge revises his or
her reservation level upward when the agent receives an o¤er from an agent of the opposite
sex who is of lower type than the reservation level. These results imply that a series of
rejections gradually reduces the reservation level of an agent through the duration of search.
Moreover, in a model with two-sided imperfect self-knowledge, the following two factors
a¤ect the reservation utility level of an agent. The rst factor is the assigning of the probability
of an agents own type. Because an agent with imperfect self-knowledge assigns probabilities
5 In this paper, we assume the non-transferable utility: there is no bargaining for the division of the total
utility. In the labor market, utility is generally transferable. However, for example, when the worker is
enthusiastic about a job because of its location, or the employer is attracted by the worker because of his
or her personality, their utilities can be considered to be non-transferable. Furthermore if the worker o¤ers
to work for a reduced wage, this wage might be restricted to above some lower bound determined outside of
the match, like a legislated minimum wage or an industry-wide union relationship (see Burdett and Wright
(1998)). In this way, when wages and all other terms of the relationship are xed in advance and there is
nothing for the pair to negotiate after they meet, their utilities can be viewed as non-transferable utility.
6Positive assortative matching is said to hold if the characteristics (types and marital charm) of those
who match are positively correlated. Becker (1973) found strong empirical evidence of a positive correlation
between the characteristics of partners.
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to his or her own possible type, the reservation level of a high-type agent is always lower than
his or her reservation level when he or she has perfect knowledge about his or her own type.
The second factor is the existence of others of the opposite sex with imperfect self-
knowledge. This factor has the following two e¤ects. The rst is the e¤ect of the chance
of learning. If the share of agents of the opposite sex with imperfect self-knowledge increases,
an agents chance of learning about his or her own type increases. The increase in the chance
of learning raises the opportunity of receiving o¤ers for a high-type agent with imperfect self-
knowledge, which raises his or her reservation level. In contrast, the increase in the chance
of learning raises the opportunity of receiving rejections for a low-type agent with imperfect
self-knowledge. This reduces his or her reservation level. The second e¤ect of the existing of
others of the opposite sex with imperfect self-knowledge is the e¤ect of a few number of others
of the opposite sex with perfect self-knowledge. The share of agents of the opposite sex with
imperfect self-knowledge increases and accordingly the share of agents of the opposite sex
with perfect self-knowledge decreases. When low-type agents with imperfect self-knowledge
reject low-type agents, the sparse existence of low-type agents of the opposite sex with per-
fect self-knowledge delays the marriages of low-type agents who learned their own types and
then accept low-type agents. As a result, the reservation level of an agent with imperfect
self-knowledge is raised to reject low-type agents because he or she prefers to learn about his
or her own type rather than to accept a low-type agent before learning.
In particular, the upward revision of an agents reservation level caused by a received
o¤er occurs because of two-sided imperfect self-knowledge. Under one-sided imperfect self-
knowledge, the upward revision of an agents reservation level does not occur. Maruyama
(2010) investigates the movement of an agents reservation over time in a two-sided search
model with one-sided imperfect self-knowledge. In Maruyama (2010), men know their own
types but women do not. If a man proposes to a woman and then she revises her reservation
level upward to reject his (actual) type by her learning, he cannot marry her. At this time,
the man can predict that his o¤er leads him to be rejected by her because he knows his own
type. Consequently, the man chooses his strategy so as to not change the reservation level
of the woman. In contrast, under two-sided imperfect self-knowledge (i.e., both men and
women do not know their own types), even if a man can predict that upon proposing to a
woman, she may raise her reservation level to reject his (actual) type, he chooses to propose
to her. This is because he cannot know whether he is accepted or rejected by her because of
his imperfect self-knowledge. These results are also supported when sex is reversed.
Moreover, this paper shows that the opportunity of upward revision of an agents reser-
vation level caused by a received o¤er depends on the knowledge about the opponents belief.
When a man (woman) cannot recognize the opponents belief about her (his) own type when
they meet, the opportunity of revision of his (her) reservation level upward decreases relative
to the case in which he (she) can recognize the opponents belief. This is because the lack
of knowledge about the opponents belief reduces the agents chance of learning. Therefore,
the lack of knowledge about the opponents belief accelerates the decline in reservation level
through the duration of search under two-sided imperfect self-knowledge.
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This paper also shows that in a steady state, the learning of low-type agents reduces
the matching rate of high-type agents to high-type agents of the opposite sex, although
the learning of high-type agents does not a¤ect their own matching rate. The learning of
low-type agents delays their own time until marriage relative to the case of perfect self-
knowledge. Because they match relatively slowly, this steady state implies that the share of
low-type agents in the market is greater than that in the case of perfect self-knowledge. In
other words, the share of high-type agents is smaller than that in the case of perfect self-
knowledge. This reduces the matching rate of high-type agents to high-type agents of the
opposite sex.
Related literature
Our paper relates to a large number of works that study individual search behavior with
incomplete information (e.g., Rothchild (1974), Morgan (1985), Burdett and Vishwanath
(1988), Bikhechandani and Sharma (1996), Adam (2001), and Dubra (2004)). Most previous
papers focus on the uncertainty about market condition in terms of the shape of the wage
distribution.7
The idea of imperfect self-knowledge with learning is termed looking-glass selfin soci-
ology and social psychology.8 Although there is much literature on the looking-glass self
in the eld of sociology and social psychology for the development of the self, the topic has
received little attention in economics. However, recent works have introduced the idea of
imperfect self-knowledge in the principal-agent model (e.g., Bénabou and Tirole (2003)).
Another strand of the literature, exemplied by the works of Zábojník (2003), Köszegi
(2006), and Andolfatto, Morgan, and Myers (2009), models the biased self-esteem generated
by agentsbeliefs about their own abilities. Their models are mainly concerned with explain-
ing how people may rationally become overcondent. However, agents in this paper have
correct beliefs in the sense that they process information rationally, have prior beliefs that
are consistent with the distribution in the market, and signals do not have noise.
In search literature of imperfect self-knowledge with learning, there are few studies that
have given attention to the imperfect self-knowledge. In Gonzalez and Shi (2010), agents
learn their own job-nding abilities by observing o¤ers or rejections from rms. In the
directed search model with two types of agents, they show that learning from search can
induce the desired wages (the wage in the chosen submarket) and reservation wages to decline
with unemployment duration. In particular, the value function of an unemployed worker
strictly increases in the workers belief in their model because a workers (or a rms) search
decision is to choose the submarket to search. Hence, the reservation wage strictly decreases
7 In search literature with Bayesian learning, agents initially do not know the types of opponents, but later,
they learn them (e.g., Jovanovic (1979), MacDonald (1982), Chade (2006), and Anderson and Smith (2010)).
There also exists search literature with Bayesian learning where agents are assumed to learn the unknown
o¤er distribution (e.g., Rothchild (1974), McLennan (1984), Burdett and Vishwanath (1988), Adam (2001),
and Dubra (2004)).
8The idea, attributed to Cooley (1902), is that people form their self-views by observing how others treat
them. That is, others are signicant as the mirrorsthat reect images of the self.
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over search spell as the workers beliefs about his or her own ability become progressively
worse. In contrast, our model is the random two-side search model with two-sided imperfect
self-knowledge. An agent with imperfect self-knowledge decides the reservation utility by
considering the composition of each (belief) type in the market and her future learning
process fully. As a result, the value function is not monotonic with respect to agents belief.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a description of the basic framework of our
analysis. In Section 3, rst, we consider partial rational expectations equilibria with perfect
self-knowledge as a benchmark case. Section 4 examines the case of imperfect self-knowledge
with knowledge about an opponents belief. More concretely, we investigate the e¤ect of
learning on the reservation level and then the e¤ect of duration of search on the reservation
level. In Section 5, we consider steady state equilibria. In Section 6, we consider the case of
lack of knowledge about the opponents belief. Section 7 concludes.
2 Basic Framework
In this section, we present a basic framework of our analysis.
Let us assume that there are a large and equal number of men and women in a marriage
market. Let N denote the participating men or women in this market. An agent in the
market wishes to marry a member of the opposite sex.
Finding a marriage partner always involves a time cost. It is di¢ cult for agents to meet
someone of the opposite sex in the market. Let  denote the rate at which a single individual
contacts a member of the opposite sex, where  is the parameter of the Poisson process. As
 is assumed to not depend on N , we have what is termed constant returns in the matching
function.
It is assumed that agents are ex-ante heterogeneous and all agents have the same ranking
about a potential partner in the marriage market. Let xk be a real number that denotes the
type (charm) of a k-type single man or woman in the market.
When both sexes meet, each agent can instantly recognize the opponents type and then
decide whether or not to propose. We assume that both agents submit their o¤ers or rejections
simultaneously in order to simplify our analysis. If at least one of the two decides not to
propose, they return to the marriage market and search for another partner. If both agents
propose, they marry and leave the marriage market permanently. We assume that, if a couple
marries, he or she obtains a utility ow equal to the spouses type per unit of time and vice
versa. That is, utilities are non-transferable: there is no bargaining for the division of the
total marital utility. Let us assume that people live forever and that there is no divorce.
Let Fi (x) ; i = m;w denote the stationary distribution of (actual) types among men (m)
or women (w) in the market. That is, Fi (x; t) = Fi (x) for all x and all t, where t denotes
the period. Let us assume that xk is drawn from Fi (x). Let x¯ i
and xi indicate the inmum
and supremum of Fi, respectively, where x¯ i
> 0. Here, we assume that Fm (x) and Fw (x) are
symmetric among men and women to simplify the analysis. All agents know Fm (x) and
Fw (x).
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3 Stationary Market Environment: Perfect Self-knowledge
In this section, we assume that all agents believe that the market can be characterized
by the stationary distribution of type among men or women. First, we investigate who
marries whomunder perfect self-knowledge as a benchmark in this section.9 In the later
section, we study cases with imperfect self-knowledge (i.e., agents do not know their own
types perfectly) and compare these cases with the benchmark cases to show the inuence of
two-sided imperfect self-knowledge on a market.
Given (Fm; Fw) and the strategies of single agents, the set of single agents of the opposite
sex who will agree to marry a k-type agent is well-dened. Let Hm (:jxk) denote the distrib-
ution of type among men who will agree to marry a k-type woman. Further, the arrival rate
of such proposals faced by a k-type woman, w (xk), is also well dened.
Let Vw (xk) denote a k-type womans expected discounted lifetime utility when single.
Standard dynamic programming arguments imply that
Vw (xk) =
1
1+rdt
h
w (xk) dtE
h
max
n
~xk
r ; Vw (xk)
o
jxk
i
+ (1  w (xk) dt)Vw (xk)
i
where given that an o¤er is made, ~xk has distribution Hm (~xkjxk). Manipulating and then
letting dt! 0 yields
rVw (xk) = w (xk)
h
E
h
max
n
~xk
r ; Vw (xk)
o
jxk
i
  Vw (xk)
i
:
The strategy that maximizes a single agents expected discounted lifetime utility takes
the form of a reservation match strategy a k-type woman will marry a man on contact if
and only if his type is at least as great as Rw (xk)  rVw (xk).
As the situation is the same for men, the expected discounted lifetime utility of a single
k-type man, Vm (xk), satises
rVm (xk) = m (xk)
h
E
h
max
n
~xk
r ; Vm (xk)
o
jxk
i
  Vm (xk)
i
: (1)
where ~xk has distribution Hw (~xkjxk). From this equation, we can obtain the reservation
match strategy of a k-type man: Rm (xk)  rVm (xk).
The equilibrium concept for this subsection is as follows.
Denition 1 When all agents know their own types, an equilibrium is a partial rational
expectations equilibrium with perfect self-knowledge (PEP):
(PEP-i) all agents maximize their expected discounted utilities given that they have correct
expectations about the strategies of all other agents in the market.
Equilibrium strategies in this section are derived from condition (PEP-i). This partial
rational expectations equilibriumis named by Burdett and Coles (1997), and here, partial
9We consider the basic framework of Burdett and Coles (1997).
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means that it may not be necessarily that the inow of agents in the market equals the outow
of agents.
In this paper, let us assume that there are two types of men or women according to their
charm: high (H) and low (L).10 A participant in the marriage market belongs to one of these
types. Let xk=r denote the (discounted) utility of marrying a k-type agent (k = H;L), where
r > 0 is the discount rate. We assume that xH > xL > 0. That is, in any equilibrium, all
agents would like to marry an H-type agent of the opposite sex. Both sexes are assumed to
obtain zero utility ow while they are single.
Let  denote the share of H-type men or women in the marriage market. Hence, (1  )
denotes the share of L-type men or women in the marriage market.
In this paper, we restrict our attention to the two equilibria (PEPs) mentioned below in
order to show the inuence of two-sided imperfect self-knowledge on a marriage market.
Denition 2 In the elitist equilibrium, high-type agents marry within their group, as do
low-type agents.
Denition 3 In the mixing equilibrium, all types accept each other.
In the elitist equilibrium, men and women of the same type marry. Therefore, we can
consider that in this equilibrium, H-type agents who marry within their group form the rst
cluster of marriages, and L-type agents who marry within their group form the second cluster
of marriages. In contrast, in the mixing equilibrium, all agents marry the rst person of the
opposite sex whom they meet. Hence, we can consider that agents who marry form one
cluster of marriages in the mixing equilibrium.
We now dene the following situations as benchmark cases: if all agents know their own
types, a PEP is elitist (E-PEP) or mixing (M-PEP). The following proposition shows the
su¢ cient conditions for an E-PEP and an M-PEP.
Proposition 1 Let us assume that all agents recognize their own types. The economy is at
an E-PEP if
xL < R
 (xH)  xH
+ r
: (2)
In contrast, if
xL  R (xH)  xH
+ r
: (3)
the economy is at an M-PEP.
Proof. See, Appendix A.
Proposition 1 means that, given constant , if the share of H-type agents of the opposite
sex is large enough or if the di¤erence between xH and xL is large enough ( >
rxL
(xH xL)),
an H-type agent turns down an L-type opposite sex agent in the market. At this time, an
10Though we construct a model with two types of agents to simplify the analysis, the qualitative features
of our results will not change under a model with n types of agents. In order to illustrate the main ndings
of this paper, one does not need n types of agents, as this complicates matters without adding intuition.
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L-type agent always accepts an L-type opposite sex agent. (Otherwise, he or she cannot
marry.) As a result, the economy is at an E-PEP.
Conversely, if there are su¢ ciently few H-type opposite sex agents or if (xH xL) is small
enough (  rxL(xH xL)), an H-type agent accepts an L-type opposite sex agent. Therefore,
the economy is at an M-PEP. At this time, all agents obtain the same expected discounted
lifetime utility: V (xL) = V (xH) <
xL
r .
If r = 0, then xL < R (xH) holds. Therefore, the equilibrium is an E-PEP when r = 0.
In the next section, we introduce imperfect knowledge about agentsown types into the
benchmark cases. To investigate the inuence of two-sided imperfect self-knowledge on a
market, in the following sections, we consider the case in which (2) or (3) holds when all
agents know their own types.
4 Two-sided Imperfect Self-knowledge
In this subsection, we introduce imperfect self-knowledge into the benchmark cases. Let
us assume that all agents understand the (actual) type distributions Fm (x) and Fw (x).
However, no agent initially knows his or her own type upon entering the marriage market.
An agent with imperfect self-knowledge may learn something about his or her actual type by
observing the o¤ers or rejections by agents of the opposite sex. Thus, an agents belief about
his or her own type depends on the agents of the opposite sex whom he or she met in the
past.11 Moreover, we assume that an agent can recognize an opponents actual type and an
opponents belief when they meet in this section.12 The case of lack of knowledge about the
opponents belief is investigated in Section 6.
For the explanation, let us suppose that a k-type woman (k = H;L) is at the start of
period t = f0; 1; :::g of single. Let  denote a set of actual types of women and bk 2 ()
denote a belief of a k-type woman, where () is the set of probability distributions over .
Let btk
 
b0k; h
t
k

denote a k-type womans belief at the start of period t about her own type after
history htk given the prior belief b
0
k 2 (0), where b0k
 
b0k; h
0
k

= b0k and 0 is a set of all actual
types of women. In this paper, we assume that b0k is the distribution of belief among those
who have not updated their beliefs yet in the market.13 Here, b0  b0k because we assume
in the following that the distribution of belief Gi (x; t) ; i = m;w is common knowledge.
Moreover, htk =

~xk; am (xk) ;~bk
0
; :::;

~xk; am (xk) ;~bk
t 1
is the k-type womans history
11As a result, there are di¤erent kinds of men (women) with di¤erent beliefs even if they belong to the same
actual type.
12 If a male (female) agent can observe the belief of his female (male) opponent when they meet, he (she)
can know her (his) action before he (she) observes her (his) action. This is because agents decide their
strategies on the basis of their beliefs. Therefore, though we assume that agents submit their o¤ers or
rejections simultaneously in this study, the results obtained in this section are the same as those in the case
of a sequential move in which a woman proposes to a man in the rst move and he proposes or rejects her in
the next move.
13Gonzalez and Shi (2009) assume that the initial prior expectation of ability for a new worker is calculated
from the distribution of new workers over the levels of ability. However, because we assume exogenous inow in
the later section, the distribution of new single agents over the levels of charm may not equal the distribution
of belief among those who have not updated their own types yet in the market.
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up to, but not including period t. Here, am (xk) 2 A = fa; a g is the action of a k-type
man
 
~xtk

observed by the k-type woman (xk) as the result of a search outcome in period
t(= 0; : : : ; t   1), where a indicates that the man proposed to the k-type woman and a 
indicates that he rejected her. Furthermore, ~bk is the belief of that k-type man. If a k-type
woman observes

~xk; a;~bk
t
(or

~xk; a
 ;~bk
t
) at period t, she knows that a k-type man with
the belief ~bk accepted (rejected) her and then she updates her belief about her own type. In
Section 6, where we investigate the case of lack of knowledge about the opponents belief,
a k-type woman observes (~xk; a)
t (or (~xk; a )
t) at period t and then she updates her belief
about her own type.
In this paper, we use the term actionto distinguish it from the reservation strategy.
Specically, in our model with discrete types, even if an agent lowers his (her) reservation
utility strategy, this does not guarantee that he (she) accepts a woman (man) whom he (she)
has rejected previously. Therefore, in the following analysis, the statement that an agent
changes his (her) action means that he (she) changes the type of women (men) whom he
(she) is willing to accept.
Let btk
 
b0; h
t
k

(xk) denote a k-type womans probability assigned to the particular type
xk 2 . This probability is determined by Bayesrule. The k-type womans posterior belief
bt+1k

b0; h
t
kj

~xk; am (xk) ;~bk
t
(xk) after observing

~xk; am (xk) ;~bk
t
at period t given her
current belief btk
 
b0; h
t
k

is given by
bt+1k

b0; h
t
kj

~xk; am (xk) ;~bk
t
(xk) =
btk(b0;h
t
k)(xk) Pr

(~xk;am(xk);~bk)
tjxk

P
xk2 b
t
k(b0;h
t
k)(xk)Pr

(~xk;am(xk);~bk)
tjxk
 ;
where bt+1k
 
b0; h
t+1
k

(xk) = b
t+1
k

b0; h
t
kj

~xk; am (xk) ;~bk
t
(xk). In what follows, because
b0 is xed in this paper, we omit explicitly writing b0.
Because we consider only pure strategies when self-knowledge is perfect in the model pre-
sented here, Pr

~xk; am (xk) ;~bk
t jxk = 0 or 1 when a k-type woman observes ~xk; am (xk) ;~bkt
given the strategies of men. Because Pr

~xk; am (xk) ;~bk
t jxk = 0 or 1 and an agents op-
timal strategy has the reservation-level property, a k-type woman knows that her actual type
does not belong to a type set. Let tk

~xk; am (xk) ;~bk
t
; htk

denote the impossible type set
of a k-type woman, which she recognizes by observing

~xk; am (xk) ;~bk
t
given htk. Then, we
can dene the set of the k-type womans remaining possible types at period t+1 recursively.
Let t+1 = tnt

~xk; am (xk) ;~bk
t
; htk

denote the set of the k-type womans remaining
possible types at the start of period t + 1, where 0 = 0: It is noteworthy that set t can
be interpreted as an information set in a sequential-move game. Therefore, from now on, we
write btk
 
htk

as bk
 
t

for the sake of simplicity because the changes in belief over time can
be represented by the elements of t.
Let Vw
 
bk
 
t

denote the lifetime expected discounted utility of a k-type woman at the
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start of period t conditional on her belief bk
 
t

. Thus,
Vw
 
bk
 
t

=
X
xk2t

bk
 
t

(xk)

Vw
 
bk
 
t

= 11+rdt
X
xk2t

bk
 
t

(xk)
 24  1  w  bk  t dtVw  b  t
+w
 
bk
 
t

dtE

max

~xk
r ; Vw

bk

tj

~xk; am (xk) ;~bk
t jxk
35 :
where ~xk has distribution Hm (~xkjxk). Manipulating and then letting dt! 0 yields
rVw
 
bk
 
t

=
X
xk2k

bk
 
t

(xk)

w
 
bk
 
t
 h
E

max
n
~xk
r ; Vw
 
bk
 
t+1
o jxk  Vw  bk  ti :
(4)
where bk
 
t+1
  bk tj~xk; am (xk) ;~bkt. The expectation operator E is taken with
respect to the belief distribution of men Gm (x; t).14 Because Vw
 
bk
 
t

depends only on
bk
 
t

, women in the same information set  at period t face the same decision problem
regardless of their actual types.
As the situation is the same for men, the lifetime expected discounted utility of a k-type
man, Vm
 
bk
 
t

; satises
rVm
 
bk
 
t

=
X
xk2k

bk
 
t

(xk)

m
 
bk
 
t
 h
E

max
n
~xk
r ; Vm
 
bk
 
t+1
o jxk  Vm  bk  ti ;
where ~xk has distribution Hw (~xkjxk) and bk
 
t+1
  bk tj~xk; aw (xk) ;~bkt. The ex-
pectation operator E is taken with respect to the belief distribution of women Gw (x; t).
In this paper, because we consider the two-types case, an agent learns about his or her own
type at most one time and therefore there are three kinds of information sets: 0  fxH ; xLg,
H  fxHg and L  fxLg. In the following analysis, let us call a kl-type agent and a
k-type agentas an agent whose actual type is k 2 fH;Lg with belief bk (l) ; l 2 f0;H; Lg;
and an agent whose actual type is k 2 fH;Lg with any belief, respectively. Moreover, we
write bl and blj(~xk;am(xk);~bk)t instead of bk (l) and bk

lj

~xk; am (xk) ;~bk
t
, respectively.15
Let Gm (x) and Gw (x) denote the stationary distribution of mens belief and that of
womens belief, respectively. That is, Gi (x; t) = Gi (x) for all x and all t. Let us assume
that Gm (x) and Gw (x) are symmetric and that all agents know Gm (x) and Gw (x) (we
later show that Gm (x) and Gw (x) depend on  and Fi (x), which are common knowledge
among all agents) and believe the market to be characterized by (Gm; Gw). However, the
particular assignment of beliefs to agents need not be known. If all agents know their own
types, Fi (x) = Gi (x) ; i = m;w.
In this section, we introduce the next equilibrium concept for our model with imperfect
14 If all agents of the opposite sex know their own types, the expectation operator E is taken with respect
to the actual type distribution of agents of the opposite sex Fi (x; t).
15When t = 0, b0 = b0.
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self-knowledge. Though each agents belief (state) changes over time, we rst focus on the
market in a stationary environment.
Denition 4 In a partial rational expectations equilibrium with imperfect self-knowledge
(PEI):
(PEI-i) agentsstrategies satisfy sequential rationality; and
(PEI-ii) agents beliefs on the sets of remaining possible types (information sets) along
the equilibrium path are consistent with Bayesian updating given the equilibrium strategies.
In a PEI, it is not necessary that the outow of the market equals the inow.16 In
the following subsection, we consider the following two PEIs: one is a mixing PEI (M-PEI)
and the other is an elitist PEI (E-PEI). An M-PEI and an E-PEI satisfy (PEI-i)(PEI-ii).
By characterizing an M-PEI and an E-PEI for any (Gm; Gw), Section 5 will identify those
(Gm; Gw) which imply that the outow distribution equals the inow distribution, thereby
identifying two possible steady state equilibria.
4.1 Matching strategies and PEIs
Agents with imperfect self-knowledge decide their optimal strategies given (Gm; Gw) and
other agentsactions (who accepts (rejects) whom) in the market. The strategy (and then ac-
tion) of each type is common knowledge among all agents, because all agents know Gi (x) ; i =
m;w.
4.1.1 An M-PEI
First, we investigate the optimal strategies of an agent with imperfect self-knowledge in an
M-PEI.
In an M-PEI, any agent accepts an L-type agent of the opposite sex. Therefore, there is
no learning in an M-PEI because an o¤er from an agent of the opposite sex does not have
information about the agent who receives that o¤er. Therefore, there are H0-type agents and
L0-type agents in an M-PEI. The stationary distribution (Gm; Gw) is given from the share
of H0-type agents and of L0-type agents.
Agents decide their optimal strategies given (Gm; Gw) and other agents actions. The
following lemma applies to a k0-type agent.
Lemma 1 Let us assume that any agent accepts an L-type agent of the opposite sex. If
xL < () RMI (b0) = xH(r+) = R (xH) ;
a k0-type agent rejects (accepts) an L-type agent of the opposite sex.
16When the outow of the market equals the inow, a PEI becomes a steady state equilibrium, which we
consider in Section 5.
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Proof. See, Appendix A.
This lemma implies that when any agent accepts an L-type agent of the opposite sex,
the decision of a k0-type agent is the same as that of an H-type agent in the case of perfect
self-knowledge. Hence, if R (xH) > ()xL, k0-type agents reject (accept) L-type agents of
the opposite sex in the case of imperfect self-knowledge. Therefore, there is no M-PEI when
R (xH) > xL. Hence, the existence of an M-PEI requires that R (xH)  xL holds. We then
immediately obtain a su¢ cient condition for an M-PEI.
Proposition 2 Suppose that xL  R (xH). At this time, the economy is at an M-PEI, in
which all agents form a cluster of marriages.
Proof. See, Appendix A.
The implications of Proposition 2 are as follows: Because there are few enough H-type
men or H-type women (RMI (b0)  xL), any agent accepts an L-type agent of the opposite
sex.
4.1.2 An E-PEI
Next, let us consider an E-PEI, in which k0-type agents reject L-type agents of the opposite
sex, HH -type agents reject L-type agents of the opposite sex, and LL-type agents accept
L-type agents of the opposite sex.17 At this time, the learning processes of men (women) are
as in Figure 1. The outline box for each type in Figure 1 represents the share of each type
of men (women):  or (1  ). For example, if an H0-type woman meets an H-type man,
then she learns that her actual type is H-type, leaving the market with him. After another
H0-type woman meets an L-type man, she becomes an HH -type woman. As a result, there
are two kinds of H-type women according to di¤erent beliefs. Here, let i 2 (0; 1) ; i = m;w
denote the share of H0-type agents (i = m, men; i = w women) in all agents i whose actual
types are H. Likewise, if an L0-type man (woman) meets an H-type woman (man), then
he (she) learns that he (she) is an LL-type. Then, i 2 (0; 1) ; i = m;w denote the share of
L0-type agents (i = m, men; i = w women) in all agents i whose actual types are L. Because
Gm (x) and Gw (x) are symmetric, m = w =  and m = w = . From  and these shares
(; ), the stationary distribution (Gm; Gw) is obtained.
The optimal strategies of agents are obtained in the next lemma.
Lemma 2 Let us assume that k0-type agents reject L-type agents of the opposite sex, HH-
type agents reject L-type agents of the opposite sex, and LL-type agents accept L-type agents
of the opposite sex. If
xL < () REI (b0)  b0(xH)xH(r+(1 )(1 ))(r++(1 ))(r+)(b0(xH)(r+(1 )(1 ))(r++(1 ))+rb0(xL)(1 )(r+)) < R
 (xH) ;
17 If k0-type agents accept L-type agents of the opposite sex, an E-PEI does not occur because men and
women of di¤erent types marry.
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where b0 (xH) =

+(1 ) and b0 (xL) =
(1 )
+(1 ) , then a k0-type agent rejects (accepts) an
L-type agent of the opposite sex. If
xL < ()REI (bL) = (1 )(1 )xLr+(1 )(1 ) < R (xL) ;
an LL-type agent rejects (accepts) an L-type agent of the opposite sex. Moreover,
REI (bH) =
xH
r+ = R
 (xH) :
Proof. See, Appendix A.
Lemma 2 means that a k0-type agent rejects (accepts) an L-type agent of the opposite sex
if there are enough (few enough) H-type agents of the opposite sex or if b0 (xH) is su¢ ciently
large (su¢ ciently small).
From Lemma 2, an agent with imperfect self-knowledge revises his or her reservation level
downward when the agent receives a rejection that has some information about his or her
own type. In contrast, an agent with imperfect self-knowledge revises his or her reservation
level upward when the agent receives an o¤er from an agent of the opposite sex who is lower
than his or her reservation level. These results imply that a series of rejections gradually
reduces the reservation level of an agent through the duration of search.
From Lemma 2, the following two factors a¤ect the reservation utility level of an agent.
The rst factor is the assigning of the probability of an agents own type. Because an
H0-type agent assigns probabilities to his or her own types, his or her reservation level is
always lower than the reservation level when he or she has perfect knowledge about his or
her own type.18 In contrast, the reservation level of an L0-type agent is lower or higher than
his or her reservation level with perfect self-knowledge, depending on the parameter values.
The second factor is the existence of others of the opposite sex with imperfect self-
knowledge. The existence of others of the opposite sex with imperfect self-knowledge has
the following two e¤ects.
The rst is the e¤ect of the chance of learning. The e¤ect of the chance of learning on the
reservation level of an agent with imperfect self knowledge is generally ambiguous. When the
share of L0-type agents of the opposite sex increases,  (1  ) in REI (b0) increases. This
increases the chance of learning of an H0-type agent, who learns that he or she is of type
HH by an o¤er from an L0-type agent of the opposite sex. As a result, the value of a single
k0-type agent who rejects an L-type agent (V r (b0)) increases and therefore the reservation
level of a k0 -type agent increases. The increase in the share of L0-type agents of the opposite
sex also increases the chance of learning of an L0-type agent, who learns that he or she is
of type LL by a rejection from an L0-type agent of the opposite sex. This increase in the
chance of learning of an L0-type agent decreases the reservation level of a k0 -type agent. In
our model with two types of agents, the increase in REI (b0) because of an H0-type agents
18The share of H0-type agents i a¤ects the reservation utility level Ri, whereas the share of H0-type agents
of the opposite sex j does not a¤ect Ri (i; j = m;w; i 6= j). This is because H-type agents of the opposite
sex reject L-type agents regardless of their beliefs at an E-PEI.
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learning is greater than the decrease in REI (b0) because of an L0-type agents learning in
absolute value.
The second e¤ect of the existing of others of the opposite sex with imperfect self-knowledge
is the e¤ect of a few number of others of the opposite sex with perfect self-knowledge. This
e¤ect raises the reservation level of an agent with imperfect self-knowledge. If the share of
L0-type agents of the opposite sex increases, the share of LL-type agents of the opposite
sex (1  ) decreases. This delays the marriages of LL-type agents, when a k0-type agent
rejects L-type agents. Hence, the value of a match to an LL-type agent of the opposite sex
after learning (V (bL)) decreases. Furthermore, when a k0-type agent accepts L-type agents,
the value of a match to an LL-type agent of the opposite sex before learning (V a (b0)) also
decreases because there are few LL -type agents of the opposite sex in the market. As a
result, the reservation utility level REI (b0) increases. In other words, a k0-type agent prefers
to learn about his or her own type rather than to accept an L-type agent before learning
when there are few LL-type agents of the opposite sex. It is noteworthy that the share of
H0-type agents of the opposite sex j does not a¤ect the reservation level of a k0-type agent
i. This is because H-type agents of the opposite sex reject L-type agents regardless of their
beliefs at an E-PEI.
From these two e¤ects, the existence of others of the opposite sex with imperfect self-
knowledge raises the reservation level of a k0-type agent in our model with two types of
agents.
The upward revision of an agents reservation level caused by a received o¤er occurs
because of two-sided imperfect self-knowledge. Under one-sided imperfect self-knowledge,
the upward revision of an agents reservation level does not occur. In Maruyama (2010), men
know their own types but women do not (one-sided imperfect self-knowledge). In Maruyama
(2010), if a man proposes to a woman and then she revises her reservation level upward
to reject his (actual) type by her learning, he cannot marry her. At this time, the man
can predict that his o¤er leads him to be rejected by her because he knows his own type.
Consequently, the man chooses his strategy so as not to change the reservation level of the
woman. In contrast, under two-sided imperfect self-knowledge, even if a man can predict that
upon proposing to a woman, she may raise her reservation level and may reject his (actual)
type, he chooses to propose to her. This is because he cannot know whether he is accepted or
rejected by her because of his imperfect self-knowledge. Therefore, the upward revision of an
agents reservation level caused by a received o¤er occurs. (These results are also supported
when sex is reversed.)
There is no E-PEI when R (xH)  xL from R (xH) > REI (b0) in Lemma 2. Hence,
the existence of an E-PEI requires that R (xH) > xL holds. We then immediately obtain
su¢ cient conditions for an E-PEI.
Proposition 3 Suppose that xL < R (xH). If xL < REI (b0), the economy is at an E-PEI,
in which men and women of the same type marry.
Proof. See, Appendix A.
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The implications of Proposition 3 are as follows. If there are enough H-type agents or if
there are enough L0-type agents of the opposite sex (xL < REI (b0)), a k0-type (k = H;L)
or an HH -type agent rejects an L-type agent of the opposite sex. Because an L0-type agent
rejects an L-type agent of the opposite sex, he or she becomes an LL-type agent sooner or
later because of rejection from an H-type agent of the opposite sex. Then, an LL-type agent
accepts an L-type agent of the opposite sex. As a result, an E-PEI occurs.
The rst cluster of marriages is not inuenced by agents who are unaware of their own
types: the learning of L0-type agents in the E-PEI delays their own time until marriage
relative to that in the E-PEP, whereas the learning of H0-type agents in the E-PEI does not
a¤ect their own time until marriage. This is because when an H-type agent meets an H-type
agent of the opposite sex, they always marry regardless of their beliefs in the E-PEI.
5 Steady State Equilibria
In a PEP and a PEI, it is not necessary that the outow of the market equals the inow.
When the outow of the market equals the inow, a PEP and a PEI become a steady state
equilibrium.
A PEP or a PEI implies that given any steady state values ((Gm; Gw) ; N), we can know
who will marry whom and can compute the exit rates of H-type and L-type agents. We
now turn to the problem of steady state equilibria to determine Gw, Gm, and N where the
corresponding PEP or PEI matching strategies imply a steady sate.
We assume that there are exogenous inows the inow of single men (and women) is
g per interval , where  is the share of single agents of H type.19
5.1 Case of perfect self-knowledge
In the case of perfect self-knowledge, Gi = Fi (i = m;w). Therefore, the results in this
subsection are the same as in the two-types case of Burdett and Coles (1997). Then, we
investigate the values of  and N where the corresponding M-PEP or E-PEP matching
strategies imply a steady sate. The equilibrium concept for this subsection is as follows.
Denition 5 When all agents know their own types, an equilibrium is a steady state equi-
librium with perfect self-knowledge (SEP):
(PEP-i) all agents maximize their expected discounted utility given that they have correct
expectations about the strategies of all other agents in the market; and
(SEP-i) the inow and outow of each type are balanced.
19Burdett and Coles (1999) give four typical assumptions of inow in search literature. To investigate
the inuence of imperfect self-knowledge compared to that of the case of perfect self-knowledge, we assume
exogenous inows, as in Burdett and Coles (1997, 1999). This assumption is more reasonable than the cloning
assumption, in which if a pair marries and leaves the market, two identical agents enter the market at once
(see Burdett and Coles (1999)).
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Condition (SEP-i) requires nding a steady state number and distribution of types in the
market so that the corresponding equilibrium strategies dened in condition (PEP-i) generate
an exit ow for each type equal to the inow of that type.
In a mixing SEP (M-SEP),
g = N;
(1  ) g =  (1  )N;
hold. This implies that N = g= and
 = : (5)
This is consistent with an M-PEP if and only if (r+)xH  xL.
In contrast, in an elitist SEP (E-SEP),
g = 2N;
(1  ) g =  (1  )2N:
This implies that the steady state share of H-type, which is denoted by ~ (), is

(1 ) =
~()2
(1 ~())2
;
where ~ (0) = 0. Moreover, we obtain ~N = g
~
2 =
g


1
2 1

 
p
 ( 1)
2 . The steady state
share of H-type is strictly increasing in  where there exists a threshold value ~ = 0:5 such
that if  < (>) ~, ~ () > (<). The intuition is that if  is small and the equilibrium
is elitist, then the exit rate of H-type agents is less than the that of L-type agents. This
implies that the number of H-type agents builds up relative to the number of L-type agents,
and in a steady state, ~ () > .20 This is also consistent with an E-SEP if and only if
~()
(r+~())
xH > xL.
Moreover, Burdett and Coles (1997) show that there exist parameter values where both
an E-SEP and an M-SEP exist.
Proposition 4 (Burdett and Coles (1997)) Both an E-SEP and an M-SEP exist if and only
if 0 <  < ~ = 0:5 and (r+)xH  xL <
~()
(r+~())
xH , where ~ () > .
Proof. Omitted.
The intuition of multiple equilibria is as follows. In an M-SEP, the share of H-type
agents is . However, in an E-SEP, the share of H-type agents is greater than  (but less
than ~ = 0:5). At the relevant parameters this higher share of H-type agents justies them
being more selective. In contrast, at an E-SEP when  > ~ = 0:5, the share of H-type agents
is lower than . Therefore, the share of H-type agents cannot support an M-SEP at the same
time.
20However, if  < () ~; ~ () < ()

1  ~ ()

:
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The welfare implications of the E-SEP and the M-SEP are as follows. Let us consider
the case in which  < ~ = 0:5 and (r+)xH  xL <
~()
(r+~())
xH . When an H-type agent
accepts an L-type agent, he or she matches quickly relative to the E-SEP. At this time, a
steady state implies that H-type agents are relatively few in number. Therefore, H-type
agents prefer to match with L-type agents rather than to continue searching for H-type
agents. Namely, an H-type agent makes other H-type agents worse o¤ by accepting an L-
type agent. Conversely, if an H-type agent rejects an L-type agent, this behavior makes other
H-type agents better o¤. As a result, the E-SEP and the M-SEP are not Pareto rankable:
H-type agents prefer the E-SEP and L-type agents prefer the M-SEP.
5.2 Case of imperfect self-knowledge
In this subsection, we investigate the values of ; ; , and N where the corresponding match-
ing strategies in an M-PEI or an E-PEI imply a steady sate. The equilibrium concept for
this subsection is as follows.
Denition 6 In a steady state equilibrium with imperfect self-knowledge (SEI):
(PEI-i); agentsstrategies satisfy sequential rationality;
(PEI-ii); agentsbeliefs on the sets of remaining possible types (information sets) along
the equilibrium path are consistent with Bayesian updating given the equilibrium strategies;
and,
(SEI-i) for each state kl(k = H;L; l=0;H; L), the inow and outow of agents are
balanced.
(SEI-i) means that the exit ow for each state kl equals the inow of that state. As a
result of (SEI-i), for each actual type k, the inow and outow of agents are balanced.
In a mixing SEI (M-SEI), the results are the same as in an M-SEP because there is no
learning.
In contrast, in an elitist SEI (E-SEI), the steady state requires that
g =  (+  (1  ))N = (+ (1  ))N
(1  ) g =  (1  ) (+  (1  ))N =  (1  )2 (1  )2N
hold in Figure 1. From these equations, the steady state share of H-type agents, which is
denoted as ^  ^ (), is dened as

(1 ) =
^
2
(^ 1)2(^ 1)2
=
^
2
(^ 2)2
(^ 1)2
: (6)
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Moreover, we obtain,
N^ = g
^
2 =
g


1  1
2
p
2
r
1
 1

+
p
 (3 4) 2
2 ;
^  ^ () = 1 ^
2 ^ ; (7)
^  ^ () = ^

2  ^

: (8)
It is noteworthy that ^ (0) = 0, ^ (0) = 0, and ^ (1) = 0 and that ^ and ^ are strictly
increasing in , and ^ is strictly decreasing in . From (6), there exists a threshold value
^ = 0:245 such that if  < (>) ^, ^ > (<). If  is small and the equilibrium is elitist,
then the exit rate of H-type agents is less than that of L-type agents. This implies that
the number of H-type agents builds up relative to the number of L-type agents, and in a
steady state, ^ () > . This is also consistent with an E-SEI if and only if RES (b0) 
^
3
xH(^ 2)

(1 ^)2+r(^ 2)2+(r^ 2r)2


 ^2(^ 1)(^ 2)2+r

2^ 9^2+12^3 6^4+^5 1

(r+)

(r+^)
> xL, where 2^   9^2 + 12^3   6^4
+ ^
5   1 < 0 because of ^ 2 (0; 1) :21
The learning of L0-type agents in the E-SEI delays their own time until marriage relative
to that in the E-SEP. Because L-type agents match relatively slowly, the steady state implies
that the number of agents N and the share of L-type agents (1  ^) in the E-SEI are greater
than in the E-SEP. As a result, the share of H-type agents in the E-SEI ^ is smaller than
that in the E-SEP ~ (), even if the number of agents in the E-SEI is larger than that in the
E-SEP. In other words, the learning of L0-type agents reduces the matching rate of H-type
agents, although the learning of H0-type agents does not a¤ect their own matching rate. As
a result, the threshold ^ is smaller than ~ because ^ () < ~ ().
An E-SEI and an M-SEI do not exist at the same time, unlike in the case of perfect self-
knowledge. Finally, we show that there do not exist parameter values where both an E-SEI
and an M-SEI exist.
Proposition 5 If xL < RES (b0) under any , there exists an E-SEI. If xL  (r+)xH under
any , there exists an M-SEI. There do not exist parameter values where both an E-SEI and
an M-SEI exist.
Proof. See, Appendix A.
The intuition is as follows. In an M-SEI, the steady state share of H-type agents is .
At an E-SEI when  > ^ = 0:245, ^ < . At an E-SEI, the probability that an agents
own type is H increases the reservation level of an agent because the share of H0-type agents
is greater than that of HH -type agents (^ > 1   ^). However, the share of H-type agents
in an E-SEI is smaller than that in an M-SEI (^ < ). This lower share of H-type agents
(^ < ) justies them being less selective. As a result, the reservation level of a k0-type agent
is lowered enough to RES (b0) < (r+)xH .
21Because d
d
RES (b0) > 0, RES (b0) is strictly increasing in :
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At an E-SEI when  < ^ = 0:245, the share of H-type agents is greater than that in
the M-SEI  (but less than ^ = 0:245). This higher share of H-type agents justies them
being more selective. However, at an E-SEI when  < ^ = 0:245, there are fewer H-type
agents than L-type agents (^ < 1  ^) and the share of H0-type agents is smaller than that of
HH -type agents in the market (^ < 1   ^). Consequently, the reservation level of a k0-type
agent is lowered enough to RES (b0) < (r+)xH .
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From these results, RES (b0) <
xH
+r under any , and then, there do not exist parameter
values where both an E-SEI and an M-SEI exist. If all agents know their own types and if
0 <  < ~ = 0:5, multiple equilibria arise. In contrast, multiple equilibria cannot arise in
that range when agents do not know their own types. The reservation level of an agent with
imperfect self-knowledge is a¤ected by the steady state distribution and the assigning of the
probability of an agents own type.23 Consequently, when 0 <  < ^ = 0:245, the lowered
reservation level does not generate multiple equilibria.24
The welfare implications of steady state equilibria are as follows. The welfare of each
actual type in the M-SEI is the same as that in the M-SEP because the number of marriages
of each actual type is the same. Similarly, the welfare of each actual type in the E-SEI is also
the same as that in the E-SEP.25
6 Lack of Knowledge about the Opponents belief
Though we assume that an agent can know the opponents belief when they meet in the
above sections, we relax this assumption in this section. That is, we assume that an agent
can know the opponents actual type but not the opponents belief.
6.1 Matching strategies and PEIs
First, let us investigate the optimal strategies of agents and PEIs.
In a mixing PEI (M-PEI2), the results are the same as in an M-PEP because there is no
learning.
In contrast, in an elitist PEI (E-PEI2), a k0-type agent (k = H;L) rejects an L-type
member of the opposite sex. At this time, the learning processes of men (women) are as in
Figure 2. Specically, even if an H0-type woman (man) meets an L-type man (woman), she
(he) remains an H0-type woman (man) after the meeting. This is because from the o¤er
22At this time, ^ is low enough to satisfy (20) and (21) in a steady sate.
23When the share of L0-type agents  increases, the existence of others with imperfect self-knowledge raises
the reservation level of an agent with imperfect self-knowledge, from Lemma 2. However, because ^ < (1  ^)
under any  since ^ 2 (0; 0:5) from (7), the e¤ect of the existence of L0-type agents is small relative to the
case in which ^ > (1  ^).
24Even if we assume the cloning assumption, there do not exist parameter values where both an E-SEI and
an M-SEI exist. This is because the share of H-type agents in the E-SEI is the same as that in the M-SEI
under the cloning assumption. Therefore, from Lemma 2, REI (b0) is always lower than the reservation level
of a k0-type agent in an M-SEI, which equals the reservation level of an H-type agent in an M-SEP R (xH).
25The rejections because of learning simply reduce the total discounted ow of utility.
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which she (he) received, she (he) cannot know whether the L-type man (woman) whom she
(he) met is of type L0 or type LL.
When an L0-type agent meets an H0-type agent of the opposite sex, she (he) becomes
an LL-type agent. Hence, there are two kinds of L-type women (men) according to di¤erent
beliefs. Let i 2 (0; 1) denote the share of L0-type agents i (= m;w) in all agents i whose
actual types are L. From  and the share  = i = j (i; j = m;w; i 6= j), the stationary
distribution (Gm; Gw) is obtained.
In an E-PEI2, a k0-type agent rejects an L-type agent of the opposite sex and LL-type
agents accept L-type agents of the opposite sex. Therefore, the optimal strategies of agents
are as in the next lemma.
Lemma 3 Let us assume that k0-type agents reject L-type agents of the opposite sex and
LL-type agents accept L-type agents of the opposite sex. If
xL < () REI2 (b0)  b0(xH)xH((1 )(1 )+r)((1 )(1 )+r)(r+b0(xH))+(+(1 ))b0(xL)r < R
 (xH) ;
where b0 (xH) = +(1 ) and b0 (xL) =
(1 )
+(1 ) , then k0-type agents reject (accept) L-type
agents of the opposite sex. If
xL < ()REI2 (bL) = (1 )(1 )xLr+(1 )(1 ) < R (xL) ;
LL-type agents reject (accept) L-type agents of the opposite sex.
Proof. See, Appendix A.
Lemma 3 implies that a k0-type agent rejects (accepts) an L-type agent of the opposite sex
if there are enough (few enough) H-type agents of the opposite sex or if b0 (xH) is su¢ ciently
large (su¢ ciently small).
From Lemma 3, the following two factors a¤ect the reservation utility level of an agent.
The rst factor is the assigning of the probability of an agents own type. As in an E-PEI,
because an H0-type agent assigns probabilities to his or her own type, his or her reservation
level is always lowered. In contrast, the reservation level of an L0-type agent is lowered or
raised depending on the parameter values.
The second factor is the existence of others of the opposite sex with imperfect self-
knowledge. This factor has the following two e¤ects.
The rst e¤ect is the e¤ect of the chance of learning. When the share of L0-type agents of
the opposite sex increases,  (1  ) in REI2 (b0) increases. That is, the chance of learning
of k0-type agents increases. However, this e¤ect decreases the reservation level of a k0-type
agent unlike in the case in which agents can recognize opponentsbeliefs. This is because
lack of knowledge about the opponents belief eliminates the chance of upward revision of the
reservation level of a k0-type agent.
The second e¤ect is the e¤ect of a few number of others of the opposite sex with perfect self-
knowledge. If the share of L0-type agents of the opposite sex increases, (1  ) in REI2 (b0)
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decreases. At this time, the value of match to an LL-type agent of the opposite sex after
learning (V (bL)) and the value of a match to an LL-type agent before learning (V a (b0))
decrease because there are few LL-type agents of the opposite sex. As a result, the the
reservation level of a k0-type agent increases.
From these two e¤ects, we get that an increase in the existence of L0-type agents of the
opposite sex decreases the reservation level of a k0-type agent in our model with two types
of agents.
Compared to the case in which an agent can recognize his or her opponents belief, we
can say that the lack of knowledge about the opponents belief accelerates the decline in
reservation level through the duration of search. When a man (woman) cannot recognize the
opponents belief about her (his) own type when they meet, the opportunity of revising his
(her) reservation level upward decreases relative to the case in which he can recognize the
opponents belief. This is because the lack of knowledge about the opponents belief reduces
the agents chance of learning.
From R (xH) > REI2 (b0) in Lemma 3, there is no E-PEI2 when R (xH)  xL. Hence,
the existence of an E-PEI2 requires that R (xH) > xL holds. We then immediately obtain
su¢ cient conditions for an E-PEI2.
Proposition 6 Suppose that xL < R (xH). If xL < REI2 (b0), the economy is at an E-PEI2
in which men and women of the same type marry.
Proof. See, Appendix A.
The implications of Proposition 6 are as follows: if there are enough H-type agents or
there are enough L0-type agents of the opposite sex (xL < REI2 (b0) < R (xH)), a k0-type
agent (k = H;L) or an HH -type agent reject an L-type agent of the opposite sex. Because
an L0-type agent rejects an L-type agent of the opposite sex, he or she becomes an LL-type
agent sooner or later because of rejection from an H-type agent of the opposite sex. Then,
an LL-type agent accepts an L-type agent of the opposite sex. As a result, an E-PEI2 occurs.
6.2 Steady state equilibria
In this subsection, we investigate the values of , , and N , where the corresponding M-PEI2
or E-PEI2 matching strategies imply a steady sate.
In a mixing SEI (M-SEI2), the results are the same as in an M-SEP because there is no
learning.
In contrast, in an elitist SEI (E-SEI2), the steady state requires that
g = N2
(1  ) g =  (1  ) (+  (1  ))N =  (1  )2 (1  )2N
hold in Figure 2. From these equations, the steady state share of H-type agents, which is
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denoted by    (), is given as

(1 ) =

2
( 1)2( 1)2
=

2( 2)2
( 1)2
: (9)
It is noteworthy that  = ^. Moreover, we obtain
N = g

2 =
g


1
2( 1)

2+
p
2
q

3
2
p
4 3 pp4 3 3+2+2 2
2 ;
   () = 1 
2  : (10)
It is noteworthy that  (0) = 0 and ^ (1) = 0 and that  is strictly increasing in  and  is
strictly decreasing in . Here, there exists a threshold value  = 0:245 such that if  < (>) ,
 () > (<). This threshold value is the same as in the case in which an agent knows the
opponents belief. If  is small and the equilibrium is elitist, then the exit rate of H-type
agents is less than the that of L-type agents. This implies that the number of H-type agents
builds up relative to the number of L-type agents and in a steady state,  () > . This is also
consistent with an E-SEI2 if and only if RES2 (b0)  (
(2 ))((2 )r+(1 ))xH
((2 )r+(1 ))(((2 ))+r)+r( 1)2
> xL.26
Similarly to the case with knowledge of opponentsbeliefs, the learning of L0-type agents
reduces the matching rate of H-type agents, although the learning of H0-type agents does
not a¤ect their own matching rate. The learning of L0-type agents in the E-SEI2 delays their
own time until marriage relative to that in the E-SEP. Because L-type agents match relative
slowly, steady state implies that the number of agents N and the share of L-type agents
(1  ) in the E-SEI2 are greater than in the E-SEP. As a result, the share of H-type agents
in the E-SEI2  is smaller than in the E-SEP ~ ().27 Therefore, the threshold  is smaller
than ~.
An E-SEI2 and an M-SEI2 do not exist at the same time, unlike in the case of perfect
self-knowledge.
Proposition 7 Under any , there do not exist parameter values where both an E-SEI2 and
an M-SEI2 exist. If xL < RES2 (b0) under any , there exists an E-SEI2. If xL  (r+)xH
under any , there exists an M-SEI2.
Proof. See, Appendix A.
The intuition is as follows. In an M-SEI2, the share of H-type agents is .
At an E-SEI2 when  >  = 0:245,  is lower than . At this time, the probability
that a k0-type agents actual type is H0 can be larger than the probability that the agents
actual type is L0 if  > 0:333.28 Moreover, the share of H-type agents can also be larger
26The reservation level RES2 (b0) is strictly increasing in , because ddR
ES2 (b0) =
r
xH(2( 1)22+2r( 1)( 3) r2(3 4))
(r2 r3+2r2 r+r 23+22)2
> 0.
27 It is noteworthy that the number of agents in the E-SEI2 is larger than in the E-SEP.
28More concretely, if  < () 0:3333, (1 )+(1 ) > ()

+(1 ) .
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than that of L-type agents ( > 1   ) when  > 0:692.29 Hence, the reservation level of
a k0-type agent is raised when  > 0:692. However, even under such a circumstance, the
smaller share of H-type agents as compared to in an M-SEI2 (~ () < ) justies agents
being less selective. As a result, the reservation level of a k0-type agent is lowered enough to
RES2 (b0) <

(r+)xH :
At an E-SEI2 when  <  = 0:245, the share of H-type agents  is greater than in an
M-SEI2  (but less than  = 0:245). However, at an E-SEI2 when  <  = 0:245, the
probability that a k0-type agents actual type is L0 is larger than the probability that the
agents actual type is H0 (
(1 )
+(1 ) >

+(1 )). Moreover, the share of H-type agents is
smaller than that of L-type agents ( < 1   ). Consequently, although the higher share
of H-type agents (~ () > ) justies them being more selective, the reservation level of a
k0-type agent is lowered enough to RES2 (b0) < (r+)xH :
From the above results, RES2 (b0) <
xH
+r under any ; then, there do not exist pa-
rameter values where both an E-SEI2 and an M-SEI2 exist unlike in the case of perfect
self-knowledge.30
The welfare implications of steady state equilibria are as follows. Similar to the case in
which agents can recognize their opponentsbeliefs, the welfare of each actual type in the
M-SEI2 is the same as that in the M-SEP because the number of marriages of each actual
type is the same. Similarly, the welfare of each actual type in the E-SEI2 is also the same as
that in the E-SEP.
7 Concluding Remarks
We analyze a two-sided search model in which we presume that agents initially do not know
their own types and learn about their own types from the o¤ers or rejections by agents
of the opposite sex. With this learning process, the two-sided aspect of a search problem
generates a signicant interest. We show that an agent with imperfect self-knowledge revises
his or her reservation level downward when the agent receives a rejection that has some
information about his or her own type. In contrast, an agent with imperfect self-knowledge
revises his or her reservation level upward when the agent receives an o¤er from a lower
type agent of the opposite sex. These results imply that a series of rejections gradually
reduces the reservation level of an agent through the duration of search. Specically, this
upward revision of an agents reservation level is generated by the environment of two-sided
imperfect self-knowledge. Moreover, the upward revision of an agents reservation level is
a¤ected by the knowledge about his or her opponents belief. When a male (female) agent
cannot recognize his female (her male) opponents belief about her (his) own type when
they meet, the opportunity of revising his (her) reservation level upward decreases relative
29 If  < () 0:69231,  < () (1  ) :
30Even if we assume the cloning assumption, there do not exist parameter values where both an E-SEI2 and
an M-SEI2 exist. This is because the share of H-type agents in the E-SEI2 is the same as that in the M-SEI2
under the cloning assumption. Therefore, from Lemma 3, RES2 (b0) is always lower than the reservation level
of a k0-type agent in the M-SEI2, which equals the reservation level of an H-type agent in the M-SEP.
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to the case in which he (she) can recognize the opponents belief. This is because the lack
of knowledge about the opponents belief reduces the agents chance of learning. Therefore,
the lack of knowledge about the opponents belief accelerates the decline in reservation level
through the duration of search under two-sided uncertainty.
This paper also shows that when all agents know their own types under the assumption of
exogenous inow, multiple equilibria arise in some parameter ranges (see Burdett and Coles
(1997)). However, the results in this study with imperfect self-knowledge show that multiple
equilibria cannot arise in the ranges where multiple equilibria arise in the case of perfect
self-knowledge. This is mainly due to the assigning of the probability of an agents actual
type.
We conclude with a discussion of some possible further extensions of this model. First, we
assume two types of agents. If we consider a model in which there are n types of agents and
many clusters of marriages, the learning process about ones own type will be very complex.
This issue is my next research work. However, if there are n types of agents and two clusters
of marriages are generated by a large enough , our results still hold.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1: First, we consider the decision of an H-type agent. He (she)
decides whether to accept or not a woman (a man) of the L-type. From (1), the expected
discounted lifetime utility of a single H-type agent V (xH) ; becomes
rV (xH) = H
 
xH
r   V (xH)

+ L

max
 
V (xH) ;
xL
r
  V (xH) . (11)
An H-type agent meets an H-type agent of the opposite sex with probability H , and
they marry. However, if an H-type agent meets an L-type agent of the opposite sex with
probability L, he or she compares xL=r and V (xH) and then decides whether or not to
propose.
If an H-type agent turns down an L-type agent of the opposite sex, V (xH) >
xL
r . From
(11), this H-type agents discounted lifetime utility when he or she is single becomes
rV r (xH) = H
 
xH
r   V r (xH)

:
On the other hand, when he or she accepts an L-type agent, i.e., xLr  V (xH) , his or her
value function is31
rV a (xH) = H
 
xH
r   V a (xH)

+ L
 
xL
r   V a (xH)

:
If V r (xH) > V a (xH) is satised, an H-type agent refuses an L-type opposite sex agent.
This inequality V r (xH) > V a (xH) means that
xL < R

i (xH)  HxHH+r :
If xL  R (xH), an H-type agent proposes to an L-type agent.
Proof of Lemma 1: When k0-type women accept low-type men, from (4), the
expected discounted lifetime utility of a single k0-type man becomes
rV (b0) = H
 
xH
r   V (b0)

+ L
 
maxfxLr ; V (b0)g   V (b0)

:
Therefore, we obtain the reservation level of a k0-type man:
RMI (b0) =
xH
(r+) = R
 (xH) :
Even if sex is reversed, these results hold.
Proof of Proposition 2: From Lemma 1, RMI (b0) = R (xH). Therefore, RMI (b0) 
xL; when xL  R (xH). Hence, all types accept each other.
31 If an H-type agent proposes to an L-type agent (VH  xL=r), the H- and L-type agents receive at least
the same number of o¤ers. Hence, VH  VL, and then we have VL  xL=r. Namely, an L-type agent wishes
to marry another L-type agent.
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Proof of Lemma 2: If a k0-type man (woman) rejects an L-type woman (man), the
expected discounted lifetime utility of a single k0-type man (woman) becomes
rV r (b0) = b0 (xH)


 
xH
r   V r (b0)

+  (1  ) (V (bH)  V r (b0))

+b0 (xL) [(+  (1  )) (V (bL)  V r (b0))] :
rV (bH) = 
 
xH
r   V (bH)

(12)
rV (bL) =  (1  ) (1  )
 
xL
r   V (bL)

(13)
b0 (xH) =

+(1 ) ; b0 (xL) = 1  +(1 ) (14)
In contrast, if he (she) accepts an L-type woman (man), his (her) expected discounted lifetime
utility becomes
rV a (b0) = b0 (xH)


 
xH
r   V a (b0)

+  (1  )  xLr   V a (b0)
+b0 (xL)

(+  (1  )) (V (bL)  V a (b0)) +  (1  ) (1  )
 
xL
r   V a (b0)

:
Therefore, we obtain the reservation level of a k0-type man (woman):
REI (b0)  b0(xH)xH(r+(1 )(1 ))(r++(1 ))(r+)(b0(xH)(r+(1 )(1 ))(r++(1 ))+rb0(xL)(1 )(r+)) : (15)
From (12) and (13),
REI (bH) =
xH
r+ = R
 (xH) ;
REI (bL) =
(1 )(1 )xL
r+(1 )(1 ) (< xL) : (16)
Then, we obtain
REI (bL) R (xL) = ( 1)rxL((1 )+r)(r+(1 )(1 )) < 0:
Therefore,
REI (b0) R (xH)
=   b0(xL)rxH(1 )(r+)(r+)(b0(xH)(r+(1 )(1 ))(r++(1 ))+rb0(xL)(1 )(r+)) < 0; (17)
and
REI (b0) REI (bL)
=   ( 1)( 1)(r+)	xL b0(xH)xH(r++(1 ))(r+(1 )(1 ))2(r+)(r+(1 )(1 ))(b0(xH)(r+(1 )(1 ))(r++(1 ))+rb0(xL)(1 )(r+)) ;
where	  [b0 (xH) (r +  (1  ) (1  )) (r + +  (1  )) + rb0 (xL) (1  ) (r + )]. Here,
i¤xL < () b0(xH)xH(r++(1 ))(r+(1 )(1 ))
2
( 1)( 1)(r+)(b0(xH)(r+(1 )(1 ))(r++(1 ))+rb0(xL)(1 )(r+)) =
r+( 1)( 1)
( 1)( 1) R
EI (b0),
REI (b0) > ()REI (bL). Therefore, if REI (b0) > xL, REI (b0) > REI (bL) holds.32
32Likewise, if xL < () r+( 1)( 1) REI (b0) ; REI (b0) > ()R (xL). Hence, if REI (b0) > xL, REI (b0)
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It is noteworthy that from (17), REI (b0) ! R (xH), when  = i = j ! 0 and
 = i = j ! 0 (i; j = m;w, i 6= j). Here, in order to investigate the e¤ect of assigning the
probability of an agents own type on the reservation utility level, let us now suppose that
i > 0 and i > 0 under j ! 0 and j ! 0. At this time, from (15) and (16), we obtain33
REIi (b0) jj ;j!0  b0(xH)xH(r+(1 ))(r+)(r+)(b0(xH)(r+(1 ))(r+)+rb0(xL)(r+)) ;
REIi (bL) jj ;j!0 = xL(1 )r+(1 ) = R (xL) :
Therefore, we obtain
REIi (b0) jj ;j!0  R (xH) =  b0(xL)rxH(r+)(r+)(b0(xH)(r+(1 ))(r+)+rb0(xL)(r+)) < 0:
This di¤erence between REIi (b0) jj ;j!0 and R (xk) ; k = H;L represents the e¤ect of
assigning the probability of an agents own type. Moreover,
REIi (b0) jj ;j!0  R (xL) = b0(xH)xH(r+ )
2 (1 )(r(r+)b0(xL)+b0(xH)(r+ )(r+))xL
(r+(1 ))(b0(xH)(r+ )(r+)+b0(xL)r(r+)) :
Here, i¤ pxH(r+ )
2
(1 )(r(r+)q+p(r+ )(r+)) =
r+ 
(1 ) R
EI
i (b0) jj ;j!0 > ()xL, REIi (b0) jj ;j!0
> ()R (xL). Therefore, ifREIi (b0) jj ;j!0 > ()xL, REIi (b0) jj ;j!0 > ()R (xL) holds.
Next, let us investigate the e¤ect of the existence of others of the opposite sex with
imperfect self-knowledge on the reservation utility level. This e¤ect is represented by the
di¤erence between REIi (b0) jj ;j!0 and REI (b0) under i > 0 and i > 0 (then, b0 (xH) >
0 and b0 (xL) > 0). Therefore, we obtain
REI (b0) REIi (b0) jj ;j!0
=
rb0(xH)b0(xL)xH(r+)(r(r+)+2( 1)2(1 ))
(r+)((b0(xH)(r+(1 )(1 ))(r++(1 ))+b0(xL)r(1 )(r+))(b0(xH)(r+(1 ))(r+)+rb0(xL)(r+))) > 0:
From the above results, we obtain
REIi (b0) jj ;j!0 < REI (b0) < R (xH) :
The di¤erence between REIi (bL) jj ;j!0 and REI (bL) represents the e¤ect of delay in
marriage because of refusals by L0-type agents. Therefore,
REI (bL) REIi (bL) jj ;j!0 = rxL( 1)(r+(1 ))(r+(1 )(1 )) < 0:
It is noteworthy that when agents are patient (r = 0), REI (b0) = REIi (b0) jj ;j!0 =
R (xH) = xH and REI (bL) = REIi (bL) jj ;j!0 = R (xL) = xL hold.
> R (xL) holds.
33At this time, it is noteworthy that b0 (xH) > 0 and b0 (xL) > 0 because w > 0 and w > 0 in (14).
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Note that
@REI(b0)
@ =
b0(xH)b0(xL)rxH(r+)(r(r+)+2( 1)2( 1)2)
(r+)(b0(xH)(r+(1 )(1 ))(r++(1 ))+rb0(xL)(1 )(r+))2 > 0:
Moreover, substituting (14) into (15), we obtain
@REI(b0)
@ =
(r+  +)r2xH( 1)( 1)(r+)(r++ )
(r+)((r+(1 )(1 ))(r++(1 ))+r(1 )(1 )(r+))2 > 0:
@REI(b0)
@ =
r2xH( 1)(r+)[( 1)2(1 )2+r(1 2)(r+)]
(r+)((r+(1 )(1 ))(r++(1 ))+r(1 )(1 )(r+))2 < 0:
Therefore, REI (b0) is strictly increasing in  whereas REI (b0) is strictly decreasing in  if
 < 12 . 
Proof of Proposition 3: From Lemma 2, if xL < REI (b0) (< Rm (xM )), an k0-type
agent rejects an L-type agent of the opposite sex. Moreover, an HH -type agent rejects an
L-type agent of the opposite sex (REI (bH) = R (xH) > xL). Therefore, LL-type agents
always accept L-type agents (0 < REI (bL) < xL) (otherwise, they cannot marry). As a
result, there exists an E-PEI, where men and women of the same type marry.
Proof of Proposition 5: From (5) and (6), we obtain
xH
+r =
^
2

^
2
+(^ 1)2(^ 1)2

r+^
2

xH :
Therefore,
RES (b0)  xH+r
=
^^
^^+^(1 ^)^xH(r+(1 ^)(1 ^))(r+^+^(1 ^))
(r+^)

^^
^^+^(1 ^)(r+(1 ^)(1 ^))(r+^+^(1 ^))+r
^(1 ^)
^^+^(1 ^) (1 ^)(r+)
   ^2
^
2
+(^ 1)2(^ 1)2

r+^
2

xH
=
r^
2
xH(^ 1)[(^(^ 2)(^ 1)+2^ 1)(r+(^ 1)(^ 1))(r+(^+^(1 ^)))^+^(1 ^)(r+)(r+^)]
(r+^)
h
^(^ 1)2(^ 2)+

2^
2 2^+1

r+^
2
i
[^(r+(^ 1)(^ 1))(r+(^+^(1 ^)))^+r^(^ 1)(^ 1)(r+)]
: (18)
From (7),

^ (^   2)

^  1

+ 2^  1

= 5^ 4^
2
+^
3 1
(^ 2)2
. Moreover,

5^  4^2 + ^3   1

=  14
 2+2p4 32 p2( 1 1(+
p
4 32 2))
3
2+
p
2( 1 1(+
p
4 32 2))
3
2
 1 because
^ = 1 12
p
2
r
1
 1

 +
p  (3   4)  2 from (6). Then, if  > 0:245 = ^, 5^  4^2 + ^3   1
> 0. Therefore, if  > ^, RES (b0) <
xH
+r .
In contrast, if  < ^,

5^  4^2 + ^3   1

< 0. At this time, if
^   ^(1 ^)(r+)(r+^)
(^(^ 2)(^ 1)+2^ 1)(r+(^ 1)(^ 1))(r+(^+^(1 ^))) > 0; (19)
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in (18), RES (b0) >
xH
+r . However, substituting (7) and (8) into (19),we obtain
^   ^(1 ^)(r+)(r+^)
(^(^ 2)(^ 1)+2^ 1)(r+(^ 1)(^ 1))(r+(^+^(1 ^)))
=

^  2
 (^ 2)3^ 11^2+13^3 6^4+^5 1r2+(^ 2)2^ 10^2+13^3 6^4+^5 1r+2^(1 ^)4^ 4^2+^3+1
5^ 4^2+^3 1

(2r+ r^ ^)(r(^ 2) )
< 0; (20)
where under ^ 2 (0; 1),

3^  11^2 + 13^3   6^4 + ^5   1

< 0,

2^  10^2 + 13^3   6^4 + ^5   1

<
0, and

4^  4^2 + ^3 + 1

> 0. Hence, RES (b0) <
xH
+r , when  < ^.
Therefore, an E-SEI cannot support an M-SEI at the same time because RES (b0) <
xH
+r
under any .
Furthermore, ^  ^ = 5^ 4^
2
+^
3 1
2 ^ . Hence, if  > (<) ^,
^ > (<) ^: (21)

Proof of Lemma 3: If a k0-type man (woman) rejects an L-type woman (man), the
expected discounted lifetime utility of a single k0-type man (woman) becomes
rV r (b0) = b0 (xH)


 
xH
r   V r (b0)

+b0 (xL) [(+  (1  )) (V (bL)  V r (b0))] :
rV (bL) =  (1  ) (1  )
 
xL
r   V (bL)

(22)
In contrast, if he (she) accepts an L-type woman (man), his (her) expected discounted
lifetime utility becomes
rV a (b0) = b0 (xH)


 
xH
r   V a (b0)

+  (1  )  xLr   V a (b0)
+b0 (xL)

(+  (1  )) (V (bL)  V a (b0)) +  (1  ) (1  )
 
xL
r   V a (b0)

:
Therefore, we obtain the reservation level of a k0-type man (woman):
REI2 (b0)  b0(xH)xH((1 )(1 )+r)((1 )(1 )+r)(r+b0(xH))+(+(1 ))b0(xL)r : (23)
From (22),
REI2 (bL) =
(1 )(1 )xL
r+(1 )(1 ) (< xL) :
Therefore,
REI2 (bL) R (xL) = ( 1)rxL((1 )+r)(r+(1 )(1 )) < 0:
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Moreover,
REI2 (b0) R (xH)
= rxH
 (1 b0(xH))(r+(1 )(1 )) (+(1 ))b0(xL)
(r+)(((1 )(1 )+r)(r+b0(xH))+(+(1 ))b0(xL)r) < 0; (24)
and
REI2 (b0) REI2 (bL)
= 
(b0(xH)(r+( 1)( 1))2)xH xL( 1)( 1)[((1 )(1 )+r)(r+b0(xH))+(+(1 ))b0(xL)r]
(r+( 1)( 1))[((1 )(1 )+r)(r+b0(xH))+(+(1 ))b0(xL)r] :
Here, i¤xL < () b0(xH)(r+( 1)( 1))
2
( 1)( 1)(((1 )(1 )+r)(r+b0(xH))+(+(1 ))b0(xL)r) =
r+( 1)( 1)
( 1)( 1) R
EI2
(b0), REI2 (b0) > ()REI2 (bL). Therefore, if REI2 (b0)  xL, REI2 (b0) > REI2 (bL) holds.34
From (24), REI2 (b0) ! R (xH) when  = i = j ! 0 and  = i = j ! 0 (i; j =
m;w; i 6= j). Here, in order to separate the e¤ects of two-sided imperfect self-knowledge,
rst, let us consider the case in which there is no agent j with imperfect self-knowledge (i.e.,
j ! 0 holds in (23) under i > 0). In this case, we obtain the reservation level of a k0-type
agent i:
REI2i (b0) jj!0  b0(xH)xH(r+(1 ))r2+r+b0(xH)2(1 ) =
b0(xH)xH(r+(1 ))
(r+(1 ))(r+b0(xH))+b0(xL)r ;
REI2i (bL) jj!0  (1 )xLr+(1 ) = R (xL) :
The di¤erence between REI2i (b0) jj!0 and R (xk) ; k = H;L, represents the e¤ect of as-
signing the probability of an agents own type. Therefore,
REI2i (b0) jj!0  R (xH)
= rxH
(b0(xH) 1)(r+ ) b0(xL)
(r+)((r+(1 ))(r+b0(xH))+b0(xL)r) < 0;
and
REI2i (b0) jj!0  REI2i (bL) jj!0
=   (1 )(r(r+)+b0(xH)
2(1 ))xL b0(xH)xH(r+(1 ))2
(r+(1 ))(r(r+)+b0(xH)2(1 )) :
Here, i¤ xL > () b0(xH)xH(r+(1 ))
2
(1 )(r(r+)+b0(xH)2(1 )) =
r+(1 )
(1 ) R
EI2
i (b0) jj!0, REI2i (b0) jj!0 <
()REI2i (bL) jj!0. Therefore, if xL  REI2i (b0) jj!0, REI2i (b0) jj!0 > REI2i (bL) jj!0 holds.
Next, we compare REI2i (b0) jj!0 with REI2 (b0). The di¤erence between REI2i (b0) jj!0
and REI2 (b0) represents the e¤ect of the existence of others of the opposite sex with imperfect
34Likewise, if xL < () r+( 1)( 1) REI2 (b0) ; REI2 (b0) > ()R (xL). Hence, if REI2 (b0) > xL, REI2 (b0)
> R (xL) holds.
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self-knowledge.
REI2 (b0) REI2i (b0) jj!0
= (r+)b0(xH)b0(xL)r
2xH( 1)
((r+(1 ))(r+b0(xH))+b0(xL)r)(((1 )(1 )+r)(r+b0(xH))+(+(1 ))b0(xL)r) < 0:
That is, the existence of others with imperfect self-knowledge decreases the reservation level
of an agent.
From the above results, we obtain
R (xH) > REI2i (b0) jj!0 > REI2 (b0) :
The di¤erence between REI2i (bL) jj!0 and REI2 (bL) represents the e¤ect of delay in
marriage because of refusals by L0-type agents. Then,
REI2 (bL) REI2i (bL) jj!0 =   rxL(1 )(r+(1 ))(r+(1 )(1 )) < 0;
It is noteworthy that when agents are patient (r = 0), REI2 (b0) = REI2i (b0) jj!0 = R (xH)
= xH and REI2 (bL) = REI2i (bL) jj!0 = R (xL) = xL hold.
Proof of Proposition 6: From Lemma 3, 0 < REI2 (b0) (< R (xH)). Therefore, if
xL < R
EI2 (b0), k0-type agents (k = H;L) reject L-type agents of the opposite sex and HH -
type agents reject L-type agents of the opposite sex. Because LL-type agents always accept
L-type agents of the opposite sex (0 < REI2 (bL) < xL) (otherwise, they cannot marry),
H-type agents marry within their group, as do L-type agents.
Proof of Proposition 7: From (5) and (9), we obtain
xH
+r =

2


2
+( 1)2( 1)2

r+
2

xH :
Therefore,
RES2 (b0)  xH+r
=

+(1 )
xH((1 )(1 )+r)
((1 )(1 )+r)
 
r+

+(1 )

!
+(+(1 ))
(1 )
+(1 ) r
  2

2
+( 1)2( 1)2

r+
2

xH ;
=

2
n
((1 )(1 )+r)r
h

2
+( 1)2( 1)2

 (+(1 ))
i
 (+(1 ))(1 )r
o
[((1 )(1 )+r)((+(1 ))r+)+(+(1 ))(1 )r]
h

2
+( 1)2( 1)2

r+
2

ixH :
Here,
h

2
+
 
  12 (   1)2   +   1  i =    1 2 32+3+1
( 2)2
from (10). Be-
cause 2   32 + 3 + 1 > 0 under  2 (0; 1), we obtain    1 2 32+3+1
( 2)2
< 0. Hence,
RES2 (b0) <
xH
+r holds under any . Therefore, an E-SEI and an M-SEI cannot occur at
the same time.
34
Moreover, 
 
1     = 4 22 1 2 . Then, if 0:29289 > (<) ,   1   > (<) . Hence,
if 0:333 33 > (<), 
 
1   > (<) , from (9).
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H0-type 
∅λ 
HH-type 
αλ (1− ∅)λ 
αη(1− λ) 
H-type men (women) 
αλ 
L0-type 
η(1− λ) 
LL-type (1 − η)(1 − λ) α(1− η)(1 − λ) 
αλ + αη(1− λ) 
L-type men (women) 
Figure 1:  An E-PEI 
 
                                      
   
 
           
 
H0-type 
λ 
H-type men (women) 
αλ 
L0-type 
η(1− λ) 
LL-type (1 − η)(1 − λ) α(1− η)(1 − λ) 
αλ + αη(1− λ) 
L-type men (women) 
Figure2 :  An E-PEI2 
